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Abstract 
Quantum mechanics gives many versions of reality but we perceive only 
one.  One potential explanation for this, the one considered here, is that the 
wave function collapses down to just one version.  The experimental 
situation is briefly reviewed, with no evidence found for collapse.  The 
theoretical position is also reviewed and found wanting.  Collapse-by-
observation schemes are logically untenable.  A mathematical theory of 
collapse must be nonlinear, a significant departure from current quantum 
theory.  In addition, the primary candidate theory, the GRW-Pearle model, 
requires instantaneous, non-local transmission of information.  It also 
requires transmission of information across versions of reality, which is 
forbidden in current quantum mechanics.  And there is no apparent 
physical quantity, such as particle number, that can provide the 
mechanism for collapse in all cases.  Further, these aspects, which are in 
disagreement with current theory, seem to be necessary for any 
mathematical theory of collapse.  The conclusion is that the outlook for 
mathematical collapse schemes is not encouraging. 
 
PACS numbers: 03.65.-w, 03.65.Ta 
 
 
 
1. Introduction. 
 
When we look at the world around us, it certainly appears to be the physical 
world, upon which we all agree.  But in quantum mechanics, the current, highly 
successful mathematical paradigm of physics, there is no unique physical world; 
instead there are many simultaneously existing versions of physical reality.  This 
most peculiar state of affairs is nicely illustrated by the famous Schrödinger’s cat 
thought experiment. 
 
A cat and a vial of cyanide are put in an enclosed box, while outside the 
box is a source of radiation and a detector.  The detector is turned on for 
one minute.  If it registers 100 or more counts, an electrical signal is sent 
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to the box, the vial of cyanide is broken, and the cat dies.  If it registers 
fewer than 100 counts, nothing happens and the cat lives.  After the 
experiment is finished, the wave function of the system consisting of the 
detector, the cat, and an observer is the sum of two terms (actually, several 
terms if one includes all possible readings of the detector) which can be 
written schematically as 
 
[det. reads more than 99 counts] [cat dead][obs. sees cat dead] 
—and— 
[det. reads less than 100 counts] [cat alive][obs. sees cat alive] 
 
These two versions of reality—including two versions of the observer—
exist simultaneously in quantum mechanics!  How are we to reconcile this with 
our perception of a seemingly unique world?  There are several possibilities.  The 
first is to suppose that quantum mechanics is just plain wrong.  But that simple 
‘out’ will not do because quantum mechanics is so successful.  It correctly 
predicts virtually all the properties of atoms, often to one part in a hundred 
million.  It correctly gives the properties of the semiconductors used in all our 
many electronic devices.  And along with a host of other successes, it correctly 
predicts many of the properties of elementary particles.  In addition, it has never 
given a result that disagrees with experiment.  So the first option, that quantum 
mechanics is wrong, is not really a possibility. 
The second option is that the wave function of quantum mechanics is not 
the physical reality we perceive.  Instead there is an actual, unique physical 
existence, made up perhaps of particles, which somehow conforms to just one of 
the versions of reality presented by quantum mechanics, and it is that physical 
reality which we perceive.  But we have shown elsewhere [1] that that is also not 
a likely possibility.  There is no evidence for it, and the very strict mathematics of 
quantum mechanics is not compatible with there being a reality underlying the 
wave function. 
A third option, the one we will examine here, is collapse of the wave 
function/state vector.  We can illustrate the basic idea by including the 
coefficients in the Schrödinger’s cat wave function, so that it reads  
 
a1 [det. reads more than 99 counts] [cat dead][obs. sees cat dead] 
—and— 
a2 [det. reads less than 100 counts] [cat alive ][obs. sees cat alive] 
 
|a1|2+|a2|2=1 
 
The a1 and a2 denote the relative ‘sizes’ of the two possibilities, with their values 
following from the quantum mechanical equations.  Now ‘collapse’ says that, for 
whatever reason, either 0,1 21  aa  so that the live cat version of reality has 
simply gone away—collapsed—and a dead cat is perceived; or 1,0 21  aa  
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and a live cat is perceived.  It is to be emphasized that the conventional equations 
of quantum mechanics do not imply this collapse; those equations imply that a1 
and a2 stay the same size forever (see the appendix).  So if collapse occurs, its 
cause must be outside conventional quantum mechanics.  It is also to be 
emphasized that there is no experimental evidence for collapse. 
 There are two general categories of collapse.  The first, collapse by 
conscious perception, is considered in section 2, where it is shown that this type 
of collapse can essentially be ruled out.  The other category includes all models 
governed by mathematics.  As a preliminary to considering these, we outline a 
few of the properties of quantum states in section 3.  Then in section 4, we 
consider the most highly developed model of collapse, that of Ghirardi, Rimini, 
Weber [2], and Pearle [3], [4].  We find, however, that this model violates so 
many of the current restrictions on physical theories that, without further 
justification, it does not seem acceptable at this point.  Gravitational theories of 
collapse are briefly considered in section 5, but their current development is such 
that they are not currently viable.  The experimental situation is reviewed in 
section 6.  There is currently no evidence for collapse, but if collapse is assumed, 
the experimental results put restrictions on the theory.  Finally we note in the 
appendix that quantum mechanics must be modified so it is nonlinear in any 
mathematical model of collapse.  This prohibits decoherence from being the 
general cause of collapse. 
 
 
2. Collapse by Conscious Perception. 
 
In this conjectured method of collapse, the wave function stays 
uncollapsed until a human observer perceives the result.  (This apparently 
assumes each human being has a ‘perceiving aspect’ which is outside physical 
reality.)  So the cat is both dead and alive until ‘consciously’ observed by 
someone.  But there are, in my view, four major problems here.  The first is that, 
as we said, there is no evidence for this (or any other) type of collapse.  The 
second is that, because the equations of motion of conventional quantum 
mechanics do not alter the magnitudes of the coefficients a1 and a2, the act of 
observation must countermand those equations in a very specific, mathematical 
way (one coefficient goes to 1, the others go to 0).  This over-ruling of the 
mathematical equations by ‘consciousness’ simply doesn’t seem acceptable to me.  
The third problem has to do with the probability law.  How would collapse 
by conscious perception lead, after many runs of an experiment, to the |ai|2 
probability law? 
The final problem involves a variation of the Renninger experiment [5].  
Do a Stern-Gerlach experiment on spin ½ silver atoms, with the source emitting 
atoms randomly at intervals of approximately 10 seconds.  The atoms in the – ½ 
state travel on one path and are detected by a nearby detector while the atoms in 
the + ½ state travel on another path and are detected by a more distant detector, 
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with the difference in flight times between the two detectors being, say, .01 
seconds.  The observer sees only the reading of the – ½ detector.  The + ½ 
detector has no visual readout, but it has an alarm that goes off 1 second after 
detecting a silver atom.  When the alarm goes off, indicating detection on the + ½ 
path, the – ½ branch of the wave function must have been collapsed (because it 
wasn’t observed) for 1.01 sec.  But the observer perceived nothing before the 
alarm went off, so the observer’s perceptions could not have caused the wave 
function to collapse.  This simple reasoning, along with no rationale for the 
probability law, appears to definitively rule out collapse by conscious perception. 
 
 
3. Properties of the Wave Function/State Vector. 
 
Before we examine the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber-Pearle (GRWP) 
mathematical collapse scheme, we need to review a few of the properties of the 
wave function/state vector.  The six most important properties are discussed in 
detail in [1], so we will give an abbreviated version here. 
 
The wave function and the state vector.  The familiar Schrödinger 
equation of quantum mechanics is an equation for the wave function, so it is, on 
the least abstract level, the wave functions, rather than particles, which are the 
‘physical objects’ in the mathematics of quantum mechanics.  A useful conceptual 
picture of the wave function is that it is matter spread out in a mist or cloud of 
varying density.  The Schrödinger equation determines the shape of the cloud, 
how it moves through space, and how it responds to other clouds corresponding to 
other ‘particles.’  The wave function of a macroscopic object like a cat or a human 
being, composed of billions of individual wave functions, is of course extremely 
complicated, but that does not prevent us from deducing its relevant general 
characteristics. 
The actual state of affairs, however, is somewhat more abstract.  
Technically when discussing quantum mechanics, we should use the abstract 
‘state vector,’ denoted by the ket notation, | , instead of the more concrete wave 
function.  In the situations we shall discuss, however, the wave function 
description is essentially identical to the ket description, so it is permissible to use 
the less abstract wave function description. 
 
A. One and Only One Perception. 
Schrödinger’s cat is one example of a general property which follows from the 
agreement in all known cases between observation and the quantum mechanically 
predicted qualitative and quantitative characteristics of the versions of reality: 
 
A1. Quantum mechanics gives many potential versions of reality, each 
represented by a ket.  
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A2. In any given instance, there is always—always—one and only one 
version that corresponds exactly to our physical perceptions.  (This is an 
extremely far-reaching statement.) 
A3. All observers agree on the perceived version. 
 
The reason why properties A2 and A3 hold is a mystery.  What we are 
investigating here is whether it is likely that they hold because there is collapse. 
 
B. Linearity. Different universes. 
The most important property of quantum mechanics is that it is a linear 
theory.  Because of this, when a state vector divides into a sum of different 
versions, each version evolves in time entirely independently of the other versions 
present.  It is as if each version is in a different universe.  (See the appendix for a 
proof and an expansion of this argument.) 
 
B1. This has a bearing on why we perceive only one branch.  The 
perception of different branches occurs in different universes that cannot 
communicate, and so we could never be communicably aware of the 
perception of more than one branch.  The version of the brain perceiving 
one ‘reality’ could not communicate that perception to a version of the 
brain perceiving another ‘reality.’  Similarly, the division into different, 
non-communicating universes implies that two observers can never 
physically disagree on what they perceive. 
 
B2. Note that linearity is not only used extensively in the calculations of 
virtually every result in quantum mechanics, but it is also necessary for 
establishing the particle-like properties of the state vector.  Because of 
linearity and invariance properties, one can prove that mass, spin, and 
charge are properties of the state vector.  If one takes linearity away, these 
theoretical results are in doubt. 
 
C. The Probability Law. 
In the Schrödinger’s cat experiment, the quantum mechanics of the 
nuclear decays will tell us that the ‘sizes’ (technically the norms, roughly the 
amount of cloud material) of the two possible wave function outcomes are 
different.  The cat alive part of the wave function might have a size of 2/3, for 
example, while the cat dead part might have a size of 1/3 (so the wave function is 
written as a1[cat alive]+a2[cat dead], with |a1|2=2/3, |a2|2=1/3).  If we do the 
Schrödinger’s cat experiment many times (perhaps using a cat with many lives), 
there is an additional law in quantum mechanics which says that 2/3 of the time 
we will see a live cat, and 1/3 of the time we will see a dead cat.   
 More generally suppose the wave function contains K versions of reality, 
designated by i (i=1,…, K).  Let the ‘size’ (norm) of version i be |ai|2, with the 
sum of the norms adding up to 1.  Then the |ai|2 probability law says: 
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If an experiment is run many times, a physical reality with characteristics 
corresponding to version i will be perceived a fraction |ai|2 of the time 
 
This probability law is well-established, but the reason why it holds is not 
currently known. 
 
C1. Consistency of the Probability Law.  Suppose we agree that the 
probability of event i is a function of the ‘size’ |ai|2 so that pi=f(|ai|2).  Then 
there are any number of ways to show that the only functional form 
consistent with the mathematics of quantum mechanics is the conventional 
f(|ai|2)= |ai|2.  The law f(|ai|2)= (|ai|2)2, for example, would give inconsistent 
results.  I will not pursue this point here, but I think C1 strongly suggests 
that the origin of the |ai|2 probability law must, to a large extent, be within 
conventional quantum mechanics. 
 
Note on collapse theories and particles.  In a collapse theory, there is the 
background assumption that physical existence consists of the state vector alone.  
This assumption itself depends on another assumption—that the state vector, by 
itself, without particles, is sufficient to account for all observations (property A2).  
So if one adheres to strict logic, one should show that quantum mechanics, by 
itself, can account for the photoelectric and Compton effects, and so on, before 
embarking upon the search for a mathematical collapse scheme.  That is, strictly 
speaking, the reasoning in [1] is a prerequisite for collapse schemes. 
 
 
4. The GRW-Pearle Mathematical Collapse Model. 
 
A. The Model. 
In a mathematical theory of collapse, there are equations that govern the 
collapse.  Because it is the most highly developed, we will primarily consider the 
mathematically elegant GRWP model of Pearle [3], [4], which builds on the work 
of Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber [2].  A thumbnail sketch of the theory is that 
space is divided up into small volumes and a random potential energy is applied 
to all the particles (particle-like wave functions) in each of the volumes. If this 
random potential energy is chosen in accord with the probabilities assigned in the 
Pearle scheme, then one and only one state will be picked out (it’s norm becomes 
very large compared to the others), with probability |ai|2. 
More specifically, one starts from a Hamiltonian equation for the state vector 
 t,| ; 
 
(1)     







  ttwtiHt
t
n
nnn ,|)(,|
,| 2  
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H is the usual quantum mechanical Hamiltonian and is usually ignored in collapse 
theories (except when trying to find experimental tests of collapse).  Space is 
divided up into fixed cubes of size on the order of 353 )10(   cm3.   The n  are 
number operators; that is, when operating on a given version of reality, they give 
the number of particles in the nth cube.    is a frequency on the order of 10-16/sec, 
and )(twn  is the random part of the potential energy at time t acting on the 
particles in the nth volume element.  )(twn is related, in the Pearle formulation, to 
a random walk (or Brownian motion) parameter, Bn (t) by  
 
(2)   dttdBtw nn /)()(   
 
Let us now suppose the state vector is the sum of K potential versions of 
reality, 
 
(3)   


K
k
k ka
1
|0,|  
 
Then if we set H=0, Eq. (1) (for given wn(t)) can be solved.  Its solution is of the 
form 
 
(4)     
 

K
k
K
k
kNkk ktkttBtBat
1 1
1 |)(|),(),...,(,|   
 
where the  ’s are exponential functions of the B’s, and there are N volume 
elements.  
The probability for a given set of )(twn  in the Pearle model is 
 
(5)   





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
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
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
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01
|)(|))((
,|,))(())(),...((

  
 
where ))((0 twP  is a white noise function.  Roughly, Eq. (5) says that those 
random walks which increase the norm are favored (the norm does not stay 
constant in this model as it does in conventional quantum mechanics).  Note that 
Eq. (5) does not hold at just one time; it holds at each instant (so the B’s are 
forced to ‘walk’ in time towards their more probable values).   
Note also that this is a nonlinear model because Eq. (5) implies that the 
wn(t) depend (probabilistically) on the coefficients, )(tk , so that  
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wn(t)=wn(t, )(tk ).  A different set of starting a’s will yield a different set of 
functions wn(t).  Thus the Hamiltonian, through its dependence on the w’s, 
depends on the coefficients, so that Eqs. (1) and (5) together imply this is not a 
linear model.   
(One can see the nonlinearity more clearly if one imagines integrating the 
Hamiltonian equation on a computer, step by small time step.  The choice 
of w’s or B’s at each step depends on the  ’s at that step, and the  -
dependent choice of w’s is put back into the Hamiltonian equation.)   
It is Eq. (5), with its dependence on the values of the a’s in all the different 
versions, which makes this model radically different from current quantum 
mechanics. 
 
B. Difficulties with the Model. 
There is nothing mathematically wrong with the model, but it has several 
questionable physics-related features which make it unlikely, in my opinion, that 
it is a ‘correct’ description of collapse.   
 
(0) No evidence.  There is no experimental evidence for collapse by any 
mechanism (section 6). 
 
(1) Form of the Hamiltonian. We do not know what the physical source 
of the random potential energy is (Pearle’s ‘legitimization’ problem [4]).  
The w’s must apparently correspond to some entirely new type of field 
because they make the equations nonlinear (section 4A and the appendix) 
and all current fields obey linear quantum mechanical equations of 
motion.   
It is worth emphasizing how different the w’s are from what is 
conventionally encountered in quantum mechanics.  Suppose we 
switch from the discrete wn(t) to a continuous w(x,t) notation, and 
think of w(x,t) as a fluctuating background field, the same in each 
version.  That is quite acceptable, but it is not the whole story.  
w(x,t) is determined in part by the  |  of Eq. (5), which 
represents an average over all versions!  There is nothing like 
this—a quantity that is the same in all versions but whose value 
depends on an average of conditions in all the different versions—
in current quantum mechanics. 
 
(2) Use of particle number.  Pearle chose particle number (or the mass in 
a given cube) as the quantity which triggered collapse because differences 
in the positions of particles are the most obvious distinguishing feature of 
the different versions of reality.  But it is unlikely that particle number (or 
the mass in a given cube) can lead to collapse in all situations (section 
4C).   
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(3) Nonlinearity.  Because Eq. (5) is nonlinear in the state vector, this 
theory of collapse is nonlinear.  This is a huge departure from 
conventional quantum mechanics, where linearity is the most basic 
principle.  More generally, any ‘continuous spontaneous collapse’ theory 
must be nonlinear (because of the results in the appendix), and giving up 
linearity is a significant change (section 3, point B2).  
 
(4) Coordination of random walks within a version.  The size of the 
volume elements is assumed to be about 10-15 cm3.  So if we have a typical 
detector volume of, say, 1 cubic millimeter, then there will be 1012 
relevant volume elements, and hence 1012 different random walks.   
Now if we think of the B’s as being produced by some physical 
process, then Eq. (5) says the processes for different volumes are not 
independent; the probabilistic choice of how Bn changes from tt   to t 
depends on the B(t)’s from all 1012 volume elements.  What highly non-
local physical mechanism could one imagine in which 1012 different 
random walks, each associated with a different volume element, are 
coordinated? 
 
(5) Coordination of random walks across different versions. Further, 
the coordination is not just between elements from different volumes.  It 
also goes across versions (the sum over values of k in Eq. (5)).  In fact, no 
such cross-version mechanism is possible in current linear quantum 
mechanics because different versions are in different, non-communicating 
‘universes’ (property B and the appendix).  Coordination of random walks 
across versions can only happen in a theory that is nonlinear. 
 
(6) Coordination of random walks: instantaneous.  Because t occurs on 
both sides of Eq. (5), the process that determines each B at time t must 
have instantaneous knowledge of the values of all the other B’s at time t, 
both in the same version and in other versions.  Physically, this seems 
most unlikely.  (Actually, physically as opposed to mathematically, Eq. (5) 
looks inconsistent to me because the probability of each Bn(t) cannot be 
known until all the Bn(t)’s are already chosen.) 
 
 (7) Consistency with the |ai|2 law.  The very specific forms of Eqs. (1) 
and (5) were chosen so that the end result matched the |ai|2 probability 
law.  There was no physical model or reasoning (apart from achieving the 
desired end result) which governed those choices.  The net result is that 
one is deriving the |ai|2 probability law from another probability law, Eq. 
(5), whose origin is unknown and whose form is simply conjectured. 
 More generally, in any proposed mathematical collapse model, one 
must explain why the model should just happen to yield the only form—
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the |ai|2 law—for the probability law that is consistent with quantum 
mechanics (property C1). 
 
C. Problem with particle number as hook. 
The GRWP approach uses particle number as the ‘hook’ upon which to hang state 
vector reduction.  If this is to work, then there must be a sufficiently large change 
in particle number in every situation.  We will argue that this almost certainly is 
not true.   
To start, we note that, as the collapse process proceeds, the ratio of the 
size of the collapsing part of the state to the non-collapsing part is approximately 
 
(6)   
2)( Nte   
 
so the approximate time for collapse is, say, 
 
(7)   3)( 2 Nt , or  2)(/3 Nt    
 
As we said in section 4A, 1610 /sec.  N is the change in the number of 
particles in some particular volume, fixed in space, between the non-detecting and 
the detecting state.  The size of the volume is taken to be 353 )10(   cm3.  The 
simplest case to apply this idea to is that of a pointer which has one position for 
no detection and a different position for detection.  In that case, N is the number 
of particles in an appropriately located 10-15 cm3 cube (the cube is filled with 
particles in one position and empty in the other), which is approximately 3x1010 
for normal densities.  If we put these numbers into Eq. (7), we have a time of 
collapse of approximately 3x10-5 sec, which is adequate (any collapse time less 
than 10-3 sec is physiologically undetectable).   
But this situation—where the cube is filled with particles in, say, the non-
detecting position and empty in the position corresponding to detection—is a 
best-case scenario.  There are many situations where there is very little, if any, 
difference in the number of particles in any cube between the non-detecting and 
the detecting state: 
 
What if the readout device has a liquid crystal display?  In any given 10-15 
cm3 cube, there is virtually no change in the number of particles between 
the state where it reads 0 and the state where it reads 1.   
 
What if the detection/readout device is a grain of film?  Again, there is 
virtually no change in the number of particles (in a given cube) between 
the unexposed and the exposed states.   
 
And what if the detection/readout device is the human eye-brain system 
directly perceiving a flash of light?  There is certainly an electrochemical 
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change in various parts of the nervous system, but there is virtually no 
change in the number of particles (in any given cube) between the non-
detecting and the detecting states. 
 
In all these cases, because 1010N , the collapse time is unacceptably long.    
One possible way out is to adjust the values of  and  , but the reduction in N  
is so large in these and probably other cases that this almost certainly won’t work.  
A second possibility is to use a different ‘hook’ (property) to trigger reduction.  
But at present, I can’t imagine a single hook that would work in all situations.  
(Use of the mass in a cube is subject to the same criticism as the use of particle 
number.)  So the ‘hook’ difficulty seems to me to be a serious problem for the 
GRWP collapse scheme. 
 
 
5. Gravitational Models. 
 
It has been proposed that gravity may be involved in collapse, either through a 
direct interaction as suggested by Penrose[6], [7] or through a model in which 
gravity leads to the fluctuating w’s [4], [8].  These proposals are consistent with 
the experimental results, which (if one assumes there is collapse) can be taken to 
imply that the coupling is proportional to the mass of the particle.  I will not 
describe these models in detail but will instead emphasize that most of the 
difficulties of section 4B, as well as the restrictive arguments of the appendix, 
also apply to gravity-based collapse. 
 
The Penrose model.  There is a slightly different arrangement of matter in 
the different versions of reality of the state vector.  And because the arrangement 
of matter affects the curvature tensor, and therefore the definition of spacetime, 
Penrose has suggested that the different versions create a ‘tear’ in the fabric of 
spacetime.  This tear is postulated to produce a force between the various versions 
of reality, and if enough particles are involved, the force is sufficient to snap the 
different versions back into just one version. 
The primary problem here is that the ‘severe’ orthogonality of equations 
(11) and (12) in the appendix will still hold, even though spacetime is different for 
the two versions.  Thus if we stick with linear quantum mechanics, there can be 
no interaction between branches; that is, there can be no force which collapses the 
different versions into a single version.  If the linearity of quantum mechanics is 
to be abandoned, the details of this radical change must be spelled out.   
The second problem with the Penrose model is that there seem to be no 
random variables.  Thus it is not clear how the process would lead to a random 
selection of states that obeys the |ai|2 law. 
 
The Stochastic Gravitational Model.  In this model, it is postulated, in 
essence, that there are fluctuations in mass distribution of the vacuum state.  
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These can be related to the fluctuating variables w.  Thus the problem of item 1 in 
section 4B is somewhat circumvented (but at the cost of introducing additional 
assumptions on fluctuations of the vacuum), and one gains a feel for why the 
coupling should be proportional to the mass.  But all the other problems remain.  
In particular, there is still an Eq. (5) or its equivalent, so the gravitational collapse 
model is nonlinear.  
 
 
6. The Experimental Situation. 
 
Our summary of the experimental situation will rely primarily on the 
review by Pearle [4].    
 
Interference experiments.  The most direct way to observe collapse would be to 
do an interference experiment, similar to those done on photons or neutrons.  If 
the observed interference pattern did not follow that derived from standard 
quantum mechanics—if it disappears, for example—then this would imply that 
the wave function had collapsed to one branch or the other.  This has been done 
with buckyballs having about 720 nucleons [9], and no deviation has been found 
from what is expected from standard quantum mechanics.  This implies 
610 /sec so current interference experiments provide very little constraint on 
the theory (where the presumed value for   is on the order of 10-16/sec).   
There have also been Superconducting QUantum Interference Device 
(SQUID) experiments in which approximately 109 electrons took part [10].  The 
interference between two states of the 109 electrons was just what quantum 
mechanics predicted, so there was no support for collapse.  It is difficult to fit this 
into the GRWP scheme because there is no N .  But still, when a state with 109 
particles shows no signs of collapse, that weakens one’s confidence in the 
possibility that there is collapse.  
 
Decays and mass constraints.  The proposed GRWP form for the theory 
adds terms to the Hamiltonian (Eq. (1)) and so it can affect certain processes.  In 
particular, it can lead to energy fluctuations that occasionally (very occasionally) 
cause the ejection of an electron from an otherwise stable atom.  In one 
experiment [11], a chunk of germanium was monitored for a year to see if there 
were decays at a particular energy.  The matrix element for the decay is 
substantial if electrons and nucleons couple equally to the collapse-producing 
fields, but it is essentially zero if the coupling is proportional to the mass.  The 
negative results (no decays) are consistent with no collapse.  If collapse is 
assumed, the results lead to the constraint 
 
(8)   
nuc
elec
nuc
elec
m
m130 

  
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where the  ’s are the coupling constants (and 000,2/1/ nucelec mm ).  That is, the 
results are consistent with the coupling being proportional to the mass, but 
completely inconsistent with an equal coupling for electron and nucleon.   
 In another experiment that yields information on the possibility of 
collapse, the smallness of the disagreement between theory and observation in the 
Sudbury experiment on solar neutrinos [12] is consistent with no collapse.  But if 
we assume collapse, it gives a constraint on coupling constants for neutrons and 
protons; 
 
(9)   3104  x
m
m
p
n
p
n

  
 
This, too, is consistent with a coupling proportional to the mass. 
 To date, the mass constraints are the only serious constraints on GRWP 
theories, but they are significant.  It apparently implies either that the coupling is 
proportional to mass (so there would be no coupling to photons and very little to 
electrons) or that the coupling is only to nucleons (in which case the random field 
would have internal symmetry group properties). 
 
 
7. Summary and Conclusion. 
 
The problem is to explain why, when quantum mechanics gives many 
versions of reality, we perceive just a single version and we all agree on the 
version.  The potential explanation investigated here is that the state vector 
collapses down to just one version.   
On the experimental side, there is no evidence whatsoever for collapse. 
There are two broadly different ‘theoretical’ mechanisms proposed for 
collapse.  The first is to assume it is caused by conscious perception.  Logic—how 
to account for the probability law, and the Renninger experiment—is strongly 
against this possibility, virtually ruling it out. 
The second type of mechanism is to have a mathematically governed 
collapse process.  The GRWP model admirably solves the mathematical problem 
of collapse—how to get (a1, a2, … , ai,…,aK) to evolve to  
(0, 0, …, 1, …,0) a fraction |ai|2 of the time.  But it encounters substantial 
problems when one looks at the physics implied by its mathematics.   
•First, it appears that the use of particle number as the hook upon which to 
hang the state vector reduction process cannot be made to cause collapse 
in all cases.   
•Second, the theory must be nonlinear.  This is a major departure from 
current quantum mechanics, where linearity is the primary property.   
•Third, the coordination between random processes located in volumes 
separated by macroscopic distances is instantaneous and non-local.   
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•Fourth, the coordination of random processes goes across versions of 
reality, which is strictly forbidden in current quantum mechanics.   
•Finally, there is no justification for the very specialized forms of the 
Hamiltonian, Eq. (1), and probability law, Eq. (5), used to produce 
collapse, except that they give the correct answer. 
In my opinion, the GRWP model, although it is ingenious and is the only well-
developed mathematical model of collapse we have, does not lend strong support 
to the conjecture that collapse occurs.  More generally, the difficulties with the 
GRWP model extend to the whole class of ‘continuous spontaneous collapse’ 
models, so the prospects for constructing an acceptable theory of collapse are, in 
my opinion, not encouraging. 
 
 
Further Work. 
 
This is the second in a series of three articles.  The first [1] showed that 
there is no evidence for particles and it is quite unlikely they exist.  In this article, 
we noted that there is no evidence for collapse, and that the construction of an 
acceptable theory of collapse encounters substantial difficulties.  It will be shown 
in the third article that if there are no particles, and if there is no collapse, then 
awareness (of one version of the wave function) cannot be based in the physical 
brain. 
 
 
Appendix.  
There Can Be No Collapse in a Linear Theory 
if the |ai|2 Probability Law Holds. 
 
We will show that there cannot be a general cause for collapse in a linear 
theory of quantum mechanics.  This result is demonstrated using a particular 
example, but the same arguments would hold whenever any ‘single-particle’ wave 
function (except perhaps that for a photon) simultaneously takes at least two 
different paths.  Since we are dealing with low-energy physics here, we are 
justified in using wave function language rather than state vector language. 
 
1. Different branches are in different universes in a linear theory.  Fire 
a spin ½ silver atom into a Stern-Gerlach device.  There will be one ‘trajectory’ 
traced out by the +½  states and another traced out by the –½  states.  Let )(t  
be the time-dependent three dimensional volume where the silver atom wave 
function is non-zero on the +½ trajectory and  )(t  the corresponding volume 
on the  –½ trajectory.  These regions are well-defined even after the two branches 
of the silver atom wave function hit the detectors, and they are non-overlapping 
after the wave function of the silver atom clears the magnet.   
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Now consider the Hamiltonian equation for the full wave function 
(including both versions of reality) describing the silver atom and the detectors; 
 
(10)      }){,(}){,(}){,(}){,( dsdsdsds xxaxxaHt
xxaxxai  
   
 
where the a’s give the relative sizes of the two versions, sx  is the coordinate of 
the silver ‘atom’ and }{ dx  represents the coordinates of all the ‘atoms’ in the 
detectors (plus the observer if one wishes).   denotes the branch of the wave 
function when xs is in region  , and   the branch when xs is in region  .  
Because the two regions do not overlap, we have 
 
(11)   0}){,(}){,(}){,(   dsdstds xxHxxixx  when sx is in region   
 
(12)   0}){,(}){,(}){,(   dsdstds xxHxxixx  when sx is in region   
 
(Note:  The H in }){,( ds xxH   does not change the location of the silver 
atom.  Thus }){,( ds xxH   in Eq. (11) is a function of xs which is 0 when 
xs is not in  .)   
Eqs. (10), (11) and (12) imply the wave functions for the two branches obey their 
own separate equations of motion, 
 
(13)   }){,(}){,( dsdst xxHxxi     (relevant when sx is in region  ) 
 
(14)   }){,(}){,( dsdst xxHxxi     (relevant when sx is in region  )  
 
(and the Hamiltonian equation is irrelevant (0=0) when sx  is in neither region.)  
Because they obey their own separate equations, and because H is independent of 
the wave function in a linear theory, the evolution of   is entirely independent 
of what happens on the   branch (and vice versa).   
 
2. Non-unitary Hamiltonian.  If H is unitary, as it is in conventional 
theory, Eqs. (13) and (14) tell us the norms of the two branches stay the same 
forever.  So there can be no collapse in this Stern-Gerlach example if one sticks to 
a linear, unitary theory.  But what would happen if we kept the Hamiltonian linear 
but allowed it to be non-unitary?  Suppose in particular that some part of the 
Hamiltonian can change the norm of the wave function, with the change 
depending on the random variables w, where the choice of w’s is independent of 
the coefficients.  Then we have for the general linear case 
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where the conjectured Hamiltonian is presumed to have no effect on the ‘shape’ 
of the wave function (and we have ignored the non-collapse part of the 
Hamiltonian).  In this case, it might happen that after some time has elapsed, 
 
(16)   
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so we end up with a system which has collapsed to state i.  Thus linearity does not 
rule out collapse. 
 
3. The |ai|2 probability law requires collapse theory to be nonlinear.  
But now suppose the collapse follows the |ai|2 probability law.  Then for large t 
we must have Eq. (16) holding a fraction |ai|2 of the time and the same equation 
with 1 replaced by 0 holding the rest of the time.  Thus to satisfy the |ai|2 
probability law, the average of the ratio must obey 
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where P is the probability of a certain set of w’s and the integral over all possible 
w’s is suitably defined.  If P(w) is independent of the coefficients, this cannot 
hold.  (To see this, take the derivative of the second and third terms in Eq. (17) 
with respect to |ai|2.  The derivative of the second term gives 0—no dependence 
on the coefficients—while the derivative of the third gives 1.)  Thus to satisfy Eq. 
(17), P(w) must depend on the coefficients (as in Eq. (5), for example). 
But this implies the reasoning of section 4A holds: At each step in the 
integration of the equations of motion, the choice of w’s dictated by 
),...,;()( 1 KwPwP   depends on the coefficients.  And then the dependence of 
the Hamiltonian on the w’s gives an indirect dependence of the Hamiltonian on 
the coefficients, so that different ai’s will produce different w’s.  This makes the 
equation of motion nonlinear, in contrast to current quantum mechanics. 
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4. Long-range Hamiltonian.  Eqs. (11-14) prohibit interactions between 
versions even if the Hamiltonian is very long-ranged.  To see this more explicitly, 
note that H contains no information about the location of the silver atom (or any 
other atom).  Thus there can be no information in H concerning the 
conditions—locations of atoms and so on—when sx is in  .  This implies the 
potential energy in H  depends on the arrangements of the ‘particles’ in the 
detectors when sx is in   (with a similar statement for H ).  So even if there 
is a long-range interaction, there can be no energy of interaction, 
 
(18)   0)'(||)(   tHt , 
 
and hence there can be no force or influence of any kind of one version on another 
in a linear theory.  Because of this, once the split occurs, no version of reality can 
change its energy.  (More generally, the isolation of versions implies that all 
conservation laws apply to each version separately.) 
 
5. Decoherence. The environment cannot be the general cause of 
collapse.  It has been suggested that the interaction with the environment 
causes—in all cases—the collapse to just one version.  There may indeed be cases 
where the environment causes collapse, but the above argument shows this cannot 
be true in all cases.  Nothing within linear quantum mechanics—including the 
environment—can lead to a collapse process that obeys the |ai|2 probability law in 
the Stern-Gerlach experiment. 
(One might try, in conventional quantum mechanics, having the wave 
functions of ‘the environment’—including, perhaps, the vacuum state—
somehow generate the random variables w.  But section 3 of this appendix 
shows that will not work because, in conventional quantum mechanics, 
there can be no coordination between branches.) 
Note that each version constitutes a different version of the whole physical 
universe, including ‘the environment,’ even though a good deal of the 
‘background’ may have the same wave function in different versions.  
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